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TORTS-LOSS OF CONSORTIUM-CHILDREN DO NOT
HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF PARENTAL
CONSORTIUM WHEN A PARENT SURVIVES A TORTIOUS
INJURY. Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989).
The common law did not permit a child to recover damages for
the loss of parental consortium I cause!i by the negligence of a third
party.2 This is still the majority view of the courts. 3 The majority of
1. Courts have provided a variety of definitions of parental consortium. These
definitions include a parent's "love, companionship, affection, society, comfort,
services and solace,"Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 14,303 N.W.2d 424,426
(1981), "love, care, companionship and guidance," Ueland v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 132 n.l, 691 P.2d 190, 191 n.l (1984) (en bane)
(citation omitted), and a parent's "society and companionship," Theama v.
City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 522, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522 (1984).
2. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143. Blackstone explained the common law
view of loss of consortium as follows:
We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken
of the wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach
and dissolution of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages
accruing therefrom; while the loss of the inferior by such injuries is
totally unregarded. One reason for which may be this: that the inferior
hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the
superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and
therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot
recover damages for beating her husband, for she hath no separate
interest in any thing during her coverture. The child hath no property
in his father or guardian; as they have in him, for the sake of giving
him education and nurture.
Id.
3. DeLoach v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 782 F.2d 438 (3d Cir.
1986) (maritime law); Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d
471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478
(D. Neb. 1980) (Nebraska law); Gray v. Suggs, 292 Ark. 19, 728 S.W.2d 148
(1987); Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138
Cal. Rptr. 302 (1977); Lee v.· Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo.
1986); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985); Halberg v. Young, 41
Haw. 634 (1957); Van de Veire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 178 Ill. App. 3d
794, 533 N.E.2d 994 (1989); Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 368 P.2d 57
(1962); McFarland v. Cathy, 349 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Durepo v.
Fishman, 533 A.2d 264 (Me. 1987); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736
(Minn. 1982); Bradford v. Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); Russell
v. Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972); De Angelis v.
Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053,449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626
(1983); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 324 N.C. 108, 376 S.E.2d 236 (1989); Morgel v.
Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980); Sanders v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 21 Ohio
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commentators, however, favor recognition of loss of parental consortium,4 and some courts have recently recognized it. 5 In Gaver v.
Harrant,6 the father of two minor children was severely injured while
helping his neighbor with a construction project. 7 He, his wife and
their children sued the neighbor in the Circuit Court for Frederick
County. 8 One of the counts in their complaint was a claim by the
children for the loss of consortium of their father. 9
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
children's parental consortium claim on the ground that the claim
was not recognized in Maryland, and the plaintiffs appealed.1O Prior
to review of the case by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,

App. 3d 249, 487 N.E.2d 588 (1985); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity
Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318 (1982); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 358 Pa.
Super. 505, 517 A.2d 1348 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266
(1988); Still v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
4. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 896-97 (4th ed. 1971); 2 s. SPEISER,
C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:23, at 590-96 (1985);
Love, Tortious Interference With the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590 (1976); Note,

The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent's Love, Care and Companionship
Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L. REV. 722 (1976); Comment,
A Minor Child's Claim for Lost Parental Society and Companionship in
Illinois: Another Look, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 113 (1984); Comment, Loss
of Parental Consortium: Why Children Should be Compensated, 18 PAC. L.J.
233 (1986); Comment, The Child's Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages:
A Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 231 (1975);
Comment, The Child's Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 5 SAN FERN.
V.L. REV. 449 (1977); Comment, Compensating the Child's Loss of Parental
Love, Care, and Affection, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 293 (1983); Note, Expanding
Loss of Consortium in Vermont: Developing a New Doctrine, 12 VT. L. REV.
157 (1987); Note, Child's R{ght to Sue for Negligent Disruption of Parental
Consortium, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 78 (1982). But see Note, Recovery for Loss
of Parental Consortium: An Undue Extension of Liability, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 285 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Recovery for Loss of Parental Consortium].
5. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Villareal
v. State Dep't of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213 (1989); Weitl v. Moes,
311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (en bane); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons,
Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1,
303 N.W.2d 424 (1981); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d
939 (1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 691 P.2d 190
(1984) (en bane); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W.2d
513 (1984).
6. 316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989).
7. Id. at 18, 557 A.2d at 21l. A 2,400-pound post and beam structure collapsed
on the father resulting in permanent injuries to his back, body, and limbs. He
cannot work and will suffer pain indefinitely. Id.

8.Id.
9. Id. The other counts in the complaint were negligence, strict liability, gross

negligence, and loss of spousal consortium. Id.

IO.Id.
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the court of appeals granted certiorari!! to consider the case, which
was one of first impression in Maryland. In a 6-1 decision,!2 the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and held that a
child does not have a cause of action for loss of parental consortium
when a parent survives a tortious injury. 13
Legal recognition of loss of consortium resulted from the common law view that the master-servant relationship was analogous to
the husband-wife relationship.!4 A master had a proprietary interest
in his servant, who, in the view of the common law, was his master's
chattelY A third party who tortiously injured a servant was liable
to the master for the loss of the servant's services resulting from the
servant's injury.!6 Based on an analogy to the master-servant relationship, a husband was deemed to have a proprietary interest in his
wife!7 and could recover damages from a tortfeasor who inflicted an
injury upon his wife that interfered with the delivery of her services
to her husband.!S Gradually, the husband's action for loss of his
wife's services was expanded, and he was permitted to recover
damages for loss of her affection, society, and companionship, as
well.!9 A father also had a proprietary interest in his children's
services, and the loss of their services that resulted from tortious
injuries inflicted upon them by a third party was actionable by the
father. 20 A wife, however, had no proprietary interest in her husband,
so she had no legal redress for the loss of her husband's services,
affection, society, or companionship, nor could a child bring an
action for the loss of his or her father's services. 2!

11. Gaver v. Harrant, 313 Md. 49, 542 A.2d 1266 (1988).
12. Gaver, 316 Md. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. Love, supra note 4, at 599-600; Note, Recovery for Loss of Parental Consortium, supra note 4; at 286.
15. See Comment, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 653
(1930).
16. Comment, A Minor Child's Claim for Lost Parental Society and Companionship in Illinois: Another Look, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 113, 116-17 (1984).
17. See Comment, supra note 15, at 653; Comment, supra note 16, at 116-17.
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 124, at 873-74; Comment, supra note 15, at
653.
19. W. PROSSER, supra note 4; § 124, at 873-74.
20. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 934 (5th ed. 1984).
Although the common law expanded in that it permitted a husband to recover
nonpecuniary damages in addition to pecuniary damages for tortious injury to
his wife, see supra text accompanying note 19, it did not so expand in the
father-child context. A father's recovery of damages for tortious injury to his.
child was limited to pecuniary losses; the loss of his child's affection, society,
and companionship was not actionable under the common law. W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra, § 125, at 934; Love, supra note 4, at 599-600.
21. Love, supra note 4, at 599-600; see supra note 2.
.
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The enactment of Married Women's Acts,22 which began in the
United States in the nineteenth century, gave wives legal identities
apart from their husbands and generally provided married women
with greater legal rights than they had had under the common law. 23
Some courts responded to the enactment of the Married Women's
Acts by refusing to recognize loss of a wife's consortium, on the
basis that these acts eliminated a husband's legal entitlement to his
wife's services, which meant that he suffered no legal damages as a
result of an injury to her. 24 The majority of courts, however, continued to recognize a husband's loss of his wife's consortium. 25
Although most jurisdictions continued to recognize the right of
a husband to recover for loss of his wife's consortium, no jurisdiction
during the first half of the twentieth century recognized a wife's
right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium. 26 Finally, in the
1950 case of Hitajjer v. Argonne Co., Inc. ,27 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized a wife's
right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium. The Hitajjer court
based its holding on an equal protection rationale. 28 The court
reasoned that because a husband was entitled to sue for the loss of
his wife's consortium, equal protection required the converse to be
permitted as well, although a wife had had no such cause of- action
under the common law. 29
Maryland initially rejected Hitajjer,30 but in 1967 the court of
appeals held that a wife did have the right to sue for loss of her
husband's consortium by bringing a joint action with her husbandY
22. For a synopsis of Married Women's Acts by jurisdiction, see 3 C. VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAMll.Y LAWS § 167 (1935). For commentary on the developments
leading to the enactment of the Married Women's Acts, see R. Chused, Married
Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983).
23. See Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning oj Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV.
1, 4 (1923). For example, the Married Women's Acts generally permitted
married women to own property and to sue without the assistance of their
husbands and also entitled married women to retain their own income. 1d.
Married women did not have these rights under the common law. See id.
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 125, at 891; Holbrook, supra note 23, at 6-8.
25. See supra note 24.
26. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37,46, 113 A.2d 82, 86 (1955).
27. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
28. See 183 F.2d at 816 ("the husband and the wife have equal rights in the
marriage relation which will receive equal protection of the law. ").
29. See id. at 816-19.
30. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 45-51, 113 A.2d 82, 86-89
(1955). For an early Maryland case which held that a wife had no cause of
action for the loss of her husband's consortium, see Emerson v. Taylor, 133
Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918).
31. Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 115, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967).
The court's holding also required a husband to bring a joint action with his
wife for injury to the marital relationship in order to recover for loss of her
consortium. [d.
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The court's decision was influenced by the possibility that equal
protection was violated by existing Maryland law which permitted
husbands, but not wives, to sue for loss of spousal consortium. 32
After the Hilaffer decision other jurisdictions also recognized a wife's
right to sue for loss of her husband's consortium, at least in part to
avoid violating equal protection. 33 Most jurisdictions in the United
States now recognize this cause of action. 34
There has recently been a line of cases which has recognized a
child's loss of parental consortium as a cause of action. 35 In the 1978
decision of Berger v. Weber,36 Michigan's intermediate appellate court
became the first appellate court which was not subsequently reversed
to recognize this cause of action. In 1980 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts became the first state court of last resort to recognize loss of parental consortium. 37 The following year, the Supreme
Court of Michigan affirmed the 1978 decision of Michigan's intermediate appellate court,38 and Michigan became the second state in
the country whose highest" court recognized the cause of action. Eight
state supreme courts have expressly recognized loss of parental consortium;39 however, most courts do not.40
Courts which have recognized loss of parental consortium have
stated a variety of reasons for doing so. First, these courts have
viewed loss of parental consortium as analogous to other kinds of
recognized consortium claims such as loss of spousal consortium,41
loss of a child's consortium,42 and loss of parental consortium under
32. The court stated that a "federal constitutional question" was presented. [d. at
113, 231 A.2d at 524. This "federal constitutional question" was a reference
to equal protection which the court had discussed earlier in its opinion. See
id. at 101-07,231 A.2d at 517-21. The Deems court also stated that it adopted
the joint action approach for legal and social policy reasons. [d. at 113, 231
A.2d at 524.
33. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 20, § 125, at 931-32; see Robinson v.
Trousdale County, 516 S.W.2d 626, 634 (Tenn. 1974) (Henry, J., concurring).
34. Comment, Who Should Recover for Loss of Consortium?, 35 ME. L. REv.
295 n.4 (1983) (44 states and the District of Columbia recognize a wife's right
to recover for loss of her husband's consortium).
35. See supra note 5.
36. 82 Mich. App. 199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978), afi'd, 411 Mich. I, 303 N.W.2d
424 (1981).
37. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690
(1980).
38. Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. I, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981), aff'g, 82 Mich. App.
199, 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978).
39. See supra note 5.
40. See supra note 3.
41. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994-95 (Alaska 1987).
42. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 512-13, 413 N.E.2d
690, 693-94 (1980); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 509, 334
N.W.2d 513, 515-16 (1984).
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a wrongful death statute. 43 Second, these courts have recognized that
children are now enjoying more legal rights and protections such as
first amendment,44 due process,4S and equal protection rights. 46 Third,
some of these courts have held that their state's legislature has a
policy of protecting children's interests and that this policy supports
recognition of a child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium. 47 Finally, these courts have been concerned about the need to
compensate children for the injury they undoubtedly sustain when
they are deprived of parental consortium. 48
Courts which have rejected a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium have generally done so based on tort law principles,
public policy grounds, or both. One of the tort law principles used
to justify rejection of the parental consortium claim is that tort law
generally permits only a primary tort victim-the person who is
directly injured by the tortfeasor-to recover damages, so a secondary
tort victim-a person who is injured by the injury to the primary
tort victim-is generally not permitted to recover against a tortfeasor.49 Another tort law principle used to reject the parental consortium
claim is that a tortfeasor does not owe a duty to the injured parent's

43. E.g., Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 515, 413 N.E.2d at 695; Berger v. Weber, 411
Mich. 1, l3, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (1981).
44. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517, 344 N.W.2d at 517.
45. Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 478, 774 P.2d 213, 217
(1989); Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517, 344 N.W.2d at 517.
46. Villareal, 160 Ariz. at 478,774 P.2d at 217; Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 517, 344
N.W.2d at 517.
47. Ferriter, 381 Mass. at 515-16, 413 N.E.2d at 695.
48. E.g., Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1981) ("compensating a child who has suffered emotional problems because of the deprivation of a parent's love and affection may provide the child with the means
of adjustment to the loss"); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d
l31, 138, 691 P.2d 190, 194 (1984) (en bane) ("Allowing a child to recover
for loss of consortium may aid in ensuring the child's continued normal and
complete mental development into adulthood."); Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 523,
344 N.W.2d at 520 ("Although a monetary award may be a poor substitute
for the loss of a parent's society and companionship, it is the only workable
way that our legal system has found to ease the injured party's tragic loss. ").
49. Berger, 411 Mich. at 34, 303 N.W.2d at 435 (Levin, J., dissenting) ("There
are few other instances [except for consortium c1aimsl where a secondary tort
victim has been permitted to recover for a negligently inflicted injury to a
relational interest unaccompanied by physical injury to himself.") (emphasis
in original); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 56061,652 P.2d 318,328 (1982) ("negligence alone, as a reason to shift the burden
of a resulting loss, has not been deemed so grievous as to hold the negligent
actor liable beyond the immediate victim's injury to others who suffer a loss
only in consequence of that injury").
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child. 50 One court which rejected the cause of action noted that tort
law usually does not impose liability for psychic injuries that are not
accompanied by a physical injury to the tort victimY
A policy reason used to support rejection of the cause of action
is the increased burden its recognition would place on the litigation
system due to the added number of claims it would permit. 52 Courts
have also expressed the need to place reasonable limits on a tortfeasor's liability as a reason to reject the cause of action. 53 Another
policy reason frequently used to support the denial of recognition of
the parental consortium claim is that recognition of the cause of
action would impose additional costs upon society through increased
insurance premiums. 54 Because of the expected increase in insurance
premiums, some courts have also been concerned that marginal
insureds would choose to be uninsured. 55 Some of these policy
concerns were explained succinctly in Russell v. Salem Transportation
Co., Inc.,56 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
If the [parental consortium] claim were allowed there would
be a substantial accretion of liability against the tortfeasor
arising out of a single transaction (typically the negligent
operation of an automobile). Whereas the assertion of a
spouse's demand for loss of consortium involves the joining
of only a single companion claim in the action with that of
the injured person, the right here debated would entail
adding as many companion claims as the injured parent had
minor children, each such claim entitled to separate appraisal
and award. The defendant's burden would be further enlarged if. the claims were founded upon injuries to both
parents. Magnification of damage awards to a single family
derived from a single accident might well become a serious
problem to a particular defendant as well as in terms of the
total cost of such enhanced awards to the insured community
as a wholeY
50. DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 84 A.D.2d 17, 22-23, 445 N.Y.S.2d
188, 193 (1981), a//'d mem., 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406, 462 N.Y.S.2d
626 (1983).
51. Norwest, 293 Or. at 548, 652 P.2d at 321.
52. See Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982).
53. Lewis v. Rowland, 287 Ark. 474, 478, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (1985); Russell v.
Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864 (1972).
54. E.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858,
862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1977); Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 741.
55. See Borer, 19 Cal. 3d at 447,563 P.2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306; DeAngelis,
84 A.D.2d at 24, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 193-94.
56. 61 N.J. 502, 295 A.2d 862 (1972).
57. [d. at 506, 295 A.2d at 864.
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Other reasons courts have used to support their rejection of
parental consortium claims include: the decision to adopt the cause
of action should be left to the legislature,58 remoteness and uncertainty
of damages are inherent in the cause of action, 59 the number of
actions that could arise from a single tort could multiply, 60 and the
possibility that an injured parent and a child would receive a double
recovery.61 Courts have also been skeptical about the ability of money
damages to compensate children for consortium losses 62 and have
rejected the argument that the failure to recognize parental consortium violates equal protection. 63 Finally, courts have also rejected

58. E.g., Lewis v. Roland, 287 Ark. 474, 477, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (1985); Zorzos
v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d
266, 267 (N.D. 1980); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 358 Pa. Super. 505, 515, 517
A.2d 1348, 1356 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988).
But see Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting the
cause of action but stating that it is not proper to defer the matter to the
legislature) .
59. Hoffman v. Dautel, 189 Kan. 165, 167, 368 P.2d 57, 58 (1962); Russell v.
Salem Transp. Co., 61 N.J. 502, 507, 295 A.2d 862, 864.
60. Hoffman, 189 Kan. at 169, 368 P.2d at 58-59; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740.
61. Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. Neb. 1980);
Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740. Both Hoesing and Salin state that the difficulty in
determining the child's damages is what can lead to a double recovery. Hoesing,
484 F. Supp. at 480; Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 740. But see Steiner, 358 Pa. Super.
at 517, 517 A.2d at 1354 (court rejects the parental consortium cause of action
but states that double recovery can be prevented by careful jury instructions),
aff'd per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1988).
62. See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1977) where the Supreme Court of California expressed this skepticism as follows:
Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; monetary
compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship
and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon
reaching adulthood, when plaintiffs will be less in need of maternal
guidance, they will be unusually wealthy men and women.
Id. at 447, 563 P .2d at 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
63. Two arguments have been advanced to assert that rejection of the cause of
action violates equal protection. One argument is that equal protection is
violated when minor children are permitted to recover damages under a
wrongful death statute for the death of a parent but not when a parent has
survived an injury. This argument has been rejected on the ground that under
the state's wrongful death statute, the surviving spouse and next of kin can
recover damages. Therefore, minor children are not a distinct category of
parties to be compensated under the wrongful death statute. Salin, 322 N.W.2d
at 742; Russell, 61 N.J. at 507-08, 295 A.2d at 865. The same equal protection
argument has also been rejected on the ground that surviving children who are
entitled to damages under a wrongful death statute are permanently deprived
of parental consortium, which generally is not the case when the parent survives.
Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 742; Russell, 61 N.J. at 508, 295 A.2d at 865; Steiner,
358 Pa. Super. at 518, 517 A.2d at 1355; cf. Norwest v. Presbyterian Inter-
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attempts to analogize parental consortium to other consortium claims. 64
The courts which have recognized the cause of action have
criticized some of the reasons used by the majority view to reject
the cause of action. For example, the courts adopting the cause of
action have rejected the view that recognition of the cause of action
is a legislative matter, because recognition of lost consortium is a
judicially created doctrine which can be modified without legislative
approval. 6S The courts adopting the cause of action have rejected
concerns raised about the remoteness and uncertainty of damages
inherent in the cause of action because these same difficulties are
tolerated by courts when they recognize other kinds of consortium
claims or other claims involving intangible injuries. 66 As to the
problems of increased insurance and societal costs which have been
used as reasons to reject the cause of action, these courts have stated
that compensating a child who has been deprived of parental consortium may offset an increase in costs to society resulting from
recognition of the cause of actionY Finally, the courts adopting the
cause of action have stated that the problem of the parent and child
being awarded a double recovery can be solved by giving proper jury
instructions,68 and that the potential problem of multiplicity of actions

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.

community Hosp., 293 Or. 543, 568, 652 P.2d 318, 332 (1982) (the distinction
between a surviving child who is compensated under a wrongful death statute
and a child whose parent is injured but survives "is not among kinds of
children but between the scope of defendants' liability for causing fatal as
distinct from nonfatal injuries to the immediate victims of their negligence").
The second kind of equal protection argument which has been made to
urge adoption of the cause of action is that equal protection is violated when
spousal consortium is recognized and parental consortium is not. This argument
has been rejected on the ground that the spousal relationship and the parentchild relationship are not comparable. Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 742; Steiner, 358
Pa. Super. at 518, 517 A.2d at 1355.
The courts which have recognized parental consortium have not stated
that equal protection requires it to be recognized. See supra note 5.
E.g., Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985) (the legislature's decision
to recognize loss of parental consortium in wrongful death cases coupled with
its failure to recognize it in nonwrongful death cases indicates the legislature
deliberately decided not to recognize parental consortium in nonwrongful death
cases); Salin, 322 N.W.2d at 739-40 (1oss of spousal consortium is distinct
from loss of parental consortium because the former is based in part on the
loss of sexual relations and the opportunity to bear children while the latter is
not).
E.g., Hay v. Medical Center Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 536-37, 496 A.2d 939, 941
(1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 136, 691 P.2d 190,
193 (1984) (en banc).
See, e.g., Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. I, 15-16,303 N.W.2d 424, 426-27 (1981);
Hay, 145 Vt. at 540-41, 496 A.2d at 943-44.
E.g., Berger, 411 Mich. at 15, 303 N.W.2d at 426; Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at
140, 691 P .2d at 195.
Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 139, 691 P.2d at 194-95; c/. Berger, 411 Mich. at 17,
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can be solved by requiring joinder of the child's and parent's claims. 69
In assessing the loss of parental consortium claim in Gaver v.
Harrant,7° the court noted that this cause of action had never been
recognized by Maryland common law. 71 The court stated that adoption of a new cause of action raised public policy concerns72 and
that the declaration of Maryland's public policy is usually a legislative
function. 73 On the other hand, the court also acknowledged that
Maryland's common law is "'subject to judicial modification in light
of modern circumstances or increased knowledge" '74 and that stare
decisis does not prevent the court from changing or modifying
Maryland common law when the court finds "'in light of changed
conditions or increased knowledge, that the [common law] rule has
become unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of
the past, no longer suitable to our people." '75 It was against this test
that the court considered the arguments for and against adoption of
loss of parental consortium as a cause of action.
The court in Gaver relied primarily on a combination of tort
law and public policy reasons to justify application of stare decisis
and thus rejected recognition of loss of parental consortium. As to
the tort law reasons, the court viewed parental consortium with
disfavor because a child who has been tortiously deprived of parental
consortium is a secondary tort victim as opposed to a primary tort
victim.76 Because the child is a secondary tort victim with only
intangible injuries, the court reasoned that the uncertainty and remoteness of damages inherent in the parental consortium claim was
"a more important factor"77 in determining whether the cause of
action should be recognized. 78 The policy reasons the court relied on
to reject the cause of action were the expansion of tort feasor liability
and the increased societal costs that recognition of the cause of action
would impose,79 coupled with the practical consideration of the
inability of money damages to remedy loss of parental consortium. 80

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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303 N.W.2d at 427 (because juries take into account the loss suffered by the
children in determining an award to the parent, a separate cause of action for
the children would eliminate the potential for a double recovery by the parent).
Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska 1987);
Ueland, 103 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 691 P.2d at 193-94.
316 Md. 17, 557 A.2d 210 (1989).
[d. at 27, 557 A.2d at 216.
[d. at 28, 557 A.2d at 216.
[d. at 28-29, 557 A.2d at 216.
[d. at 27-28, 557 A.2d at 216 (quoting Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529
A.2d 365, 366 (1987».
[d. at 28, 557 A.2d at 216 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983».
[d. at 30, 557 A.2d at 217.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 31, 557 A.2d at 217-18.
[d. at 30, 557 A.2d at 217.
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The court also rejected arguments that the cause of action was
analogous to spousal consortium 81 or to loss of parental consortium
under Maryland's wrongful death statute. 82
Although the court in Gaver recognized that children sustain a
loss when they are deprived of parental consortium,83 it concluded
"that adoption of the proposed cause of action is not compelled by
changing circumstances nor by a pressing societal need. The existing
rule has not 'become unsound in the circumstances of modern life."'84
Thus, the court declined to recognize the cause of action and stated
that any change in the law should be made by the legislature. 85
Judge Adkins dissented because he believed that adoption of the
cause of action was consistent with the legislature's policy of protecting children and preserving the family unit. 86 In addition, the

81. Id. at 31, 557 A.2d at 218. The court cited differences between the childparent relationship and the husband-wife relationship to distinguish parental
from spousal consortium. Id. The court also noted that in Maryland the spousal
consortium claim does not belong to either spouse individually but that it
belongs to the marital entity. Id. (citing Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247
Md. 95, 108-15, 231 A.2d 514, 523-25 (1967».
82. Gaver, 316 Md. at 32-33, 557 A.2d at 218. Maryland's wrongful death statute
permits a minor child to recover "damages for mental anguish, emotional pain
and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection ... parental
care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education
where applicable." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d)(1989). The
court distinguished claims for loss of parental consortium in nonfatal cases
from loss of parental consortium claims actionable under wrongful death
statutes by stating that the claims under wrongful death statutes were created
legislatively, not judicially. Gaver, 316 Md. at 32-33, 557 A.2d at 218 (citing
Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1985». Furthermore, the court stated
that policy reasons support recognition of loss of parental consortium in
wrongful death cases because the failure to recognize such claims along with
the application of the pecuniary loss rule "could result in no recovery at all if
the victim was an unproductive member of society, very old or young, or
disabled." Id. at 32-33, 557 A.2d at.218.
83. Gaver, 316 Md. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218.
84. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442,
459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983».
85. Id.
86. Id. at 33, 557 A.2d at 219 (Adkins, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the
following Maryland statutes to demonstrate that Maryland's legislature has
such a policy: MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-401 (1984) (legislature's policy
is to "promote family stability, to preserve family unity, and to help families
achieve and maintain self reliance."); id. § 5-203(b)(1) (1984) (parents are
responsible for the "support, care, nurture, welfare, and education" of their
children); id. § 5-313(a) (Supp. 1988) (best interests of the child governs whether
custody rights of natural parents may be terminated); id. § 5-502 (1984)
(Maryland's public policy is to protect foster children); id. §§ 5-701 to -715
(Supp. 1988) (protects children from abuse and neglect); id. § 5-801 (Supp.
1988) (provides criminal sanctions for leaving children unattended); id. § 5-
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dissent asserted that it was anomalous to permit a child to recover
for the loss of a deceased parent's consortium under the wrongful
death statute and to recognize loss of spousal consortium, and yet
reject the proposed cause of action.87 The dissent also contended that
permitting a child to recover consortium damages would help the
child adjust to his or her injury, which would in turn benefit society.88
The holding in Gaver was justified, and the court's rationale
was generally well-reasoned as to both the tort law concerns and the
public policy concerns presented by the proposed cause of action.
The court correctly viewed loss of parental consortium with disfavor
because tort law disfavors compensating parties who are not directly
injured by a tortfeasor's conduct. 89 While legal recognition of loss
of spousal consortium is an exception to this rule, spousal consortium
claims are necessarily limited to two people, whereas loss of parental
consortium claims could interject a significantly larger number of
plaintiffs into a case, depending on the number of children in the
primary tort victim's family.90 Therefore, the majority's concern
about the expansion of tortfeasor liability and the corresponding
increased societal costs that would accompany adoption of the cause
of action91 was justified. This in turn justified the court's holding
that the common law rule which did not recognize the cause of
action was not unsound and that consequently, a change to this rule
should be made only by the legislature. 92
The dissenting opinion was not persuasive for several reasons.
In attempting to establish that the cause of action should be recognized because of the legislature's policy of protecting children and
preserving the family unit, the dissent relied on authority inapposite
to the case under review. While the dissent was correct that Maryland
does have such a public policy, most of the authorities relied on by
the dissent to demonstrate that this policy exists were based primarily
on family law, not tort law. 93 Thus, the dissent used family law

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.

l002(b)(2) (1984) (children born out of wedlock have the same rights as children
not born out of wedlock); id. § 9-202(a) (1984) (guidelines for resolving custody
disputes attempt to protect the best interests of children); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1984 & Supp. 1988) (children have a cause of
action for lost parental consortium in the case of a wrongful death of a parent).
316 Md. at 38-45, 557 A.2d at 221-24.
Gaver, 316 Md. at 43, 557 A.2d at 223-24 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
Id. at 45-46,557 A.2d at 225 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. Weber,
411 Mich. 1, 15, 303 N.W.2d 424,.426 (1981».
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 57; see, e.g., Borer v. American Airlines,
Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 449, 563 P.2d 858, 863-64, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307-08
(1977) (injured parent had nine children).
Gaver, 316 Md. at 31, 557 A.2d at 217.
See id. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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principles to justify the adoption of a new tort which possessed
characteristics disfavored by tort law. 94
The dissent's analogy to spousal consortium was not persuasive
because spousal consortium and parental consortium involve two very
dissimilar relationships - the husband~wife relationship, and the
parent~child relationship, respectively. The type of consortium claim
most analogous to loss of parental consortium is loss of a child's
consortium, because both of those claims involve the parent~child
relationship. Since Maryland law does not recognize loss of a child's
consortium in nonfatal cases,9S reasoning by analogy to Maryland's
existing consortium law would actually support the majority's view
rather than the view of the dissent. The dissent's analogy to loss of
parental consortium under the wrongful death statute was not com~
pelling either, because a child's loss of a fatally injured parent's
consortium is always total and permanent, which is not necessarily
so when a parent is not fatally injured. 96 The dissent also failed to
consider that legal recognition of a husband's loss of his wife's
consortium is based on an anachronism97 and that the recent expan~
sion of spousal consortium in Maryland and elsewhere which now
permits wives to recover for loss of their husband's consortium98 was
in part a result of equal protection requirements. 99 By contrast, equal
protection does not require legal recognition of loss of parental
consortium. 100
94. See supra note 49 and accompanying text stating that tort law generally does
not permit a secondary tort victim to recover damages; supra text accompanying
notes 76-78.

95. See infra note 96. The dissent erroneously believed that Maryland law recognizes
loss of a child's consortium. See id.
96. The dissent also cited Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961);
Seglinski v. Baltimore Copper Co., 149 Md. 541, 131 A. 774 (1926); Hussey
v. Ryan, 64 Md. 426, 2 A. 729 (1886); County Comm'rs v. Hamilton, 60 Md.
340 (1883); and MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-205 to -206 (1984), for the
proposition that Maryland allows "a parent ... to recover for loss of a minor
child's services, society, etc." 316 Md. at 37, 557 A.2d at 221 (emphasis added).
The dissent was mistaken in part because Hudson, Seglinski, Hussey, and
Hamilton recognized the right of a parent to recover damages for medical
expenses or loss of a child's services; they did not recognize that a parent
could recover for nonpecuniary damages such as loss of a child's society. The
common law generally did not permit a parent to recover damages for loss of
a child's society. See supra note 20. Furthermore, §§ 5-205 to 206 permit a
parent to recover damages for a child's lost services and earnings; they do not
permit a parent to recover for loss of a child's society.
97. See supra note 2; supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text discussing the
proprietary interest a husband had in his wife's services, affection, and companionship at common law.
98. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
100. Note, Recovery for Loss of Parental Consortium, supra note 4, at 296-97; see
supra note 63 and accompanying text. But see Love, supra note 4, at 606-07.
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In addition to rejecting loss of parental consortium as a cause
of action in Maryland, the decision in Gaver clearly indicates that
in the foreseeable future, the court of appeals will view with disfavor
proposals for the court to adopt other kinds of consortium claims
which have not been previously recognized in Maryland. 1ol
In Gaver v. Harron!, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that children do not have a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium when a parent survives a tortious injury. The court
rejected the cause of action largely because recognition of it would
result in the expansion of tortfeasor liability and increased societal
costs and because a consortium claim is for intangible harm sustained
by a party who is not the primary victim of a tort. As a result of
the decision in Gaver, Maryland has joined the majority of jurisdictions which refuse to recognize loss of parental consortium.
James E. Myers

101. An example of such a consortium claim is a parent's loss of a child's consortium
which is not recognized in Maryland, see supra note 95 and accompanying
text, but is recognized in some jurisdictions. E.g., Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz.
309, 705 P.2d 1360 (1985); Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d
495 (1975). Another potential consortium claim which is unlikely to be recognized in Maryland in light of Gaver is loss of an unmarried cohabitant's
consortium which some commentators have suggested should be recognized.
See Comment, Iowa Cohabitants Denied Recovery Jor Loss oj Consortium, 69
IOWA L. REv. 811 (1984); Comment, Loss oj Consortium: Extending the Cause
oj Action to Cohabitators in Hawaii, 10 U. HAW. L. REv. 291 (1988); Note,
Expanding Loss oj Consortium in Vermont: Developing a New Doctrine, 12
VT. L. REv. 157, 170-80 (1987).

